Introduction
The purpose of this chapter is to examine the economic theory and empirical evidence on crime and punishment for economic crimes (for example, fraud and tax evasion) and new technology off enses (for example, computer hacking and viruses), with reference to the role of the United States Sentencing Commission ('Commission') in aff ecting individual behavior. 1 This chapter relies upon the economic theory of individual behavior known as the rational actor paradigm. Under this theory, it is assumed that white-collar criminals are no diff erent from most law-abiding citizens. They are rational decision makers acting in what they perceive to be their own best interest.
2 Although one might question whether off enders who engage in crimes of passion are rational, there should be little controversy in this view of off enders who commit economic crimes such as fraud and tax evasion. As rational decision makers, white-collar criminals base their decision to commit an economic crime upon their subjective evaluation of the expected costs and benefi ts of committing the crime. Even if actions appear irrational, they may be based on the off ender's perception of risk and opportunities. Of course, potential white-collar criminals are not the only decision makers that aff ect the crime rate. Others who play a role are clearly have been to reduce computer crime, its net eff ect might be only a minimal reduction in the overall consumer fraud rate. Alternatively, it might simply induce off enders to use more sophisticated and costly forms of evasion. Ultimately, how much (if any) the overall consumer fraud rate will decrease will depend in part on the cost of committing a crime using a computer versus other fraud vehicles and the cost to consumers of avoiding victimization on the computer.
The concept of an 'optimal' level of crime may appear to be morally repugnant to people who believe the government should attempt to eradicate all social evils. 5 In particular, it might be diffi cult to accept the fact that there will always be some crime and that public policymakers will in eff ect tolerate some crime. Yet, both private citizens and policymakers make such diffi cult decisions every day.
For example, storeowners must choose how best to cope with the problem of shoplifting. By employing elaborate security measures, they can reduce the level of this crime or if security is suffi ciently onerous, perhaps eliminate it completely. Consider the example in a retail store of locked chains used to protect expensive leather jackets from being stolen. Although the use of chains may virtually eliminate shoplifting of these leather jackets, it also imposes very real costs on storeowners, including the cost of the security device and the lost revenues from customer dissatisfaction that results from having to wait for a salesperson to unlock each coat and supervise the entire purchase process. These costs could exceed the store's losses due to shoplifting, in which case the storeowner might forego this form of crime prevention. Ultimately, the storeowner selects a level of security, and hence implicitly, a positive level of crime, that she believes will maximize net profi ts.
Of course, the storeowner is not the only actor in this drama. Shoplifting is a crime, and one that results in punishment for the off ender who is convicted. Part of the decision calculus of the storeowner and the potential shoplifter is knowledge about what the criminal justice system will do. What is the likelihood that the shoplifter will be caught? If caught, how much time will it take the storeowner to deal with the criminal justice system? How expensive is it to prosecute and convict the shoplifter? What sanction will the judge impose for this off ense? All of these questions are important and interrelated. For example, if judges are reluctant to impose any signifi cant sanctions on shoplifters, prosecutors might decline those cases or accept minimal plea bargains or pre-trial diversions. However, 5 See Kenneth G. Dau-Schmidt, 'An Economic Analysis of the Criminal Law as a Preference-Shaping Policy', Duke Law Journal, I, 11-12 (1990 that does not necessarily mean shoplifting will increase dramatically. If the risk of being penalized by the criminal justice system decreases, storeowners may increase their surveillance and prevention measures, as these forms of preventive expenditures become more cost eff ective relative to punishment. However, if the sanction is very severe -so that shoplifters are guaranteed a year in prison, for example -store owners will shift some of the cost of prevention onto the criminal justice system. Thus, fewer storeowners will purchase costly security systems that help reduce crime, and instead they will rely on the deterrent eff ect of strict sentencing to reduce shoplifting. The lessons learned from the shoplifting example can be applied to economic crimes as well. As individual consumers or business people, we take all kinds of precautions against fraud. We hang up on telephone sales persons even if we might otherwise be interested in the product being off ered, since we are concerned that the party on the other end -whom we do not know -is attempting to swindle us out of our hard-earned money. Similarly, on the Internet, we are reluctant to deal with merchants we are not familiar with since it is much easier to 'move' on the Internet than to close up a store and open in another town where nobody knows the storeowner's reputation. We are reluctant to give out credit card information over the Internet because unauthorized eyes can easily intercept our transmissions. We are reluctant to bid in online auctions because we do not know if the seller is trustworthy and will deliver what he promises. Of course, purchasing products over the Internet and bidding in online auctions are both relatively safe activities with low frequencies of fraud. Why? Both individuals and businesses take costly actions to prevent and/or raise the costs to potential off enders from committing these frauds. Thus, many consumers will not give out their credit card information on the Internet unless they know that the company uses appropriate encryption technology. Similarly, many consumers will not bid in an online auction unless they know that the auction company has a feedback mechanism to check on the reputation of the seller, and/or they off er insurance against fraud. Finally, many consumers will also look for a well-known, established fi rm that has an existing reputation. All of these prevention activities are costly -to businesses and ultimately to consumers. In some cases, where these protections are not available, consumers will decide that taking these actions are too costly relative to the benefi ts, and they will decide either to take a chance or to forego the transaction altogether -perhaps taking a costly trip to a 'bricks and mortar' retail store instead.
Moreover, the availability of criminal remedies might have an eff ect on the amount of prevention expenditures undertaken by businesses and consumers. If I know that the penalty for computer fraud, for example, is very severe and that the chance of getting caught is very high, I might be less reluctant to use the Internet to make purchases. However, I might also take less care in avoiding a potentially fraudulent vendor. The question then becomes whether it is more cost eff ective to rely upon prevention or punishment to deter fraud. At the same time, if enforcement is very stringent and penalties are severe, in a climate of rapidly changing technology and intellectual property, some marginal companies might decide that the risk of being labeled a criminal is too great a risk to go into that line of business altogether.
6 Thus, some 'innocent' individuals or companies might not engage in the socially benefi cial activity at all.
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More formally, there are several types of costs associated with economic crimes: (1) social harm 8 which is often equated with the term 'loss' that is used in the fraud guidelines of the Commission, 9 (2) the cost of apprehending and convicting off enders -law enforcement and the criminal justice system, (3) the cost of imposing sanctions -collecting fi nes, constructing and maintaining prisons, probation offi cers, etc., (4) the cost to potential victims who take preventive measures to avoid being a victim, (5) the cost to innocent individuals who are or may be charged with crimes they did not commit, and (6) the resources devoted to committing the crime itself (for example, telephones, computers, mailing list rentals). Under an economic approach to crime, the goal of society is to minimize the sum of all six of these costs.
Although I am framing the question of writing sentencing guidelines in 6 See Jeff rey S. Parker, 'Criminal Sentencing Policy for Organizations', American Criminal Law Review, 26, 513, 554-63 (1989) (discussing optimal penalties and overdeterrence). 7 See Daniel L. Rubenfeld, 'Econometrics in the Courtroom', Columbia Law Review, 85, 1048, 1051 (1985) ('Type 1 errors involve the cost of concluding that an activity was illegal -for example, that there was discrimination amounting to a violation of Title V11 -when in fact it was not. Type 2 errors involve the cost of wrongly concluding that an activity was not illegal, when in fact it was'). We are seeing this to some extent in the area of privacy rights on the Internet. 8 Technically, 'social cost' and 'loss' are not the same thing. Loss is closer to the concept of an 'externality' than to a social cost, since the former may include private losses (for example, transfers from victim to the off ender) that are not always considered to be social losses. For a discussion of these concepts in the context of crime, see Mark A. terms of an 'optimal' level of crime, this goal is not necessarily incompatible with the traditional goals of sentencing. Instead, it helps to operationalize the often confl icting goals of deterrence, incapacitation, rehabilitation, and retribution. 10 For example, although the optimal crime control model is similar to a deterrence model, it recognizes that deterrence comes at a price -and that its benefi ts should be balanced against its costs. Similarly, incapacitation makes sense when the cost of imprisonment is less than the expected harm caused by recidivism, and rehabilitation is good when its costs are outweighed by its crime control (or other social) benefi ts.
Complicating the picture, there are at least fi ve distinct decision makers: (1) potential off enders, (2) potential victims, (3) law enforcement, (4) the courts, and possibly (5) individuals potentially accused of committing a crime they did not commit. It is important to understand the interrelationships between these parties. To do that, we must fi rst ask what motivates their actions, and how we can predict the eff ect of changing sentencing policy on the actions of each of these fi ve categories of decision maker.
Potential off enders
We are all potential off enders.
11 Ultimately, while this is often an 'implicit' decision, we each weigh the benefi ts of evading or breaking any particular law against the cost of being caught. The expected benefi ts from committing an economic crime are generally monetary. However, it is also possible that off enders receive psychic benefi ts from economic crimes -such as peer approval, a feeling of importance, or 'getting back at the system'. Many computer crimes appear to be motivated more by these psychic benefi ts than by pure monetary benefi ts. How else do you explain most computer viruses and hackers? Although some of this activity is motivated by money, such as extortion, it seems that some computer crime is perpetrated for the psychic rewards that the off ender receives from crashing other computers.
10
For a description of the goals of sentencing in the criminal law, see Model Penal Code § 1.02(2)(a-d) (1985) .
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For example, although I do not think I would ever be tempted to commit a fraud or evade taxes, the reason I am not so tempted is not that I am inherently any diff erent from someone who does. Instead, the perceived costs of evading taxes, for example, far outweigh any benefi ts I can see from doing so. In other words, in choosing what is best for me, I weigh the benefi ts from tax evasion -saving money -against the costs of tax evasion -which include the expected penalty, possible prison sentence, and moral outrage I would expect to endure from my family, friends, and community. On April 15 every year, I choose to honestly report my taxes. However, for someone who chooses otherwise, they perceive the expected benefi ts from tax evasion to exceed the expected cost to them.
The expected costs to the off ender include the expected sanction -which depends on the risk of being caught, indicted, and convicted, as well as the expected severity of punishment if convicted. It might also depend on the extent to which the potential off ender believes his standing or reputation in the community will be aff ected. Will this reduce his long-term opportunities for employment? Will this reduce his stature among family and friends? These are all expected costs that the potential off ender will weigh against the potential gain from committing the crime.
Notice that I have used the terms 'expected' costs and 'expected' benefi ts. The expected cost from criminal action includes both the negative value (utility) to the criminal of the expected sanction from committing the crime and the foregone opportunities that the criminal gives up in order to pursue criminal activity. The expected sanction is calculated as the probability of apprehension and conviction multiplied by the sanction that the off ender expects to be imposed. Thus, in order to fully understand the potential off ender's decision calculus, one should look at the off ender's personal perception of variables such as the likelihood of apprehension, conviction, and imprisonment, even if that diff ers from actual rates. For example, if all potential embezzlers believe there is a 100 percent chance of being apprehended and convicted, even if the truth were that only one in ten embezzlers were caught -this crime would probably be non-existent.
Although all potential criminals may face the same expected sanction for the same crime, diff erent people may value that expected sanction diff erently. For example, an individual who is risk averse (that is, prefers certain outcomes to gambles) will react diff erently to a 50 percent chance of being convicted than an individual who prefers risk.
12 All else equal, the risk-loving individual will be more likely to commit the crime, since he or she is less responsive to the chance of being convicted than the risk-averse individual. Not only do people diff er in their preferences toward risk, but they may also diff er on such dimensions as moral standards, family responsibilities, concern for the social stigma of having a criminal record, and tolerance toward living in a prison environment. Diff erences in these and other individual dimensions will yield diff erences in the value the individual places on being sanctioned and thus on the degree of responsiveness to those sanctions.
In addition to the negative value of the expected sanction, the potential criminal must consider the foregone legitimate and criminal opportunities as a cost of criminal activity. 13 Foregone legitimate opportunities from engaging in criminal activity include: current wages that the criminal could be earning if he or she did not engage in criminal activity, the value of leisure time the criminal gives up while engaging in criminal activity, and the value of future earning opportunities that may be lost if the individual develops a criminal record. Foregone criminal activity includes the other crimes that the criminal could commit instead of the current one. That is, the potential off ender not only considers whether or not to commit a crime, but which crime to commit. This decision will again be based on the (perceived) expected costs and benefi ts of each type of crime.
Not all potential criminals have the same opportunities. People diff er in their ability, training, and access to criminal opportunities. For example, increased computer literacy will inevitably increase the rate of crime committed through the use of a computer. In addition, increased opportunities to earn money in legitimate occupations will reduce the crime rate.
Given our understanding of the costs and benefi ts of criminal activity, in order to reduce the propensity of potential off enders to commit crimes, we need to raise the expected cost of the criminal activity and/or reduce the expected benefi ts. There are many diff erent actions that society can undertake to aff ect the crime rate, including: making it more technologically diffi cult and thus more expensive to commit a crime, 14 providing more non-criminal opportunities to earn a legitimate income, 15 increasing the psychic costs of crime through public information and education campaigns, encouraging negative peer pressure and other forms of social stigmas, 16 and increasing the expected punishment through increasing the probability of detection or increasing the severity of punishment. 
Potential victims
Each potential victim decides what level of resources to devote to avoidance or prevention activities by examining the perceived expected costs and expected benefi ts of prevention. The expected benefi ts of prevention consist of the harm caused by the criminal act that is avoided, multiplied by the reduced probability of becoming a victim. The costs of prevention include the physical costs such as security systems, software programs, and auditors. But the costs of prevention also include more subtle costs and foregone opportunities such as the cost of not engaging in an online auction due to fear of being defrauded. 18 The cost of prevention is likely to diff er by considerable amounts by the type of potential victim. More sophisticated computer users are likely to be able to avoid becoming fraud victims at a much lower cost than others. More vulnerable victims, such as the elderly, might have a higher cost of prevention.
Potential victims will react to changes in the expected costs and benefi ts of prevention. Elderly individuals have extremely low victimization rates 19 among both street crimes and white-collar crimes (with some apparent important exceptions such as telemarketing fraud). The reason is that they generally realize they are especially vulnerable and take added precautions to avoid situations that put them at risk. A sudden change in the crime rate will also aff ect the costs and benefi ts of preventive measures by potential victims. For example, increased access to private information on the Internet that lowers the cost of committing identity theft or credit card fraud also increases the expected benefi t to potential victims from taking preventive or avoidance measures. Thus, if the government now takes actions that otherwise decrease the crime rate -such as signifi cantly increasing the sanction for identity theft or credit card fraud -this will decrease the expected benefi t of taking private preventive actions. Hence, potential victims will respond to the increased probability of detection or increased severity of punishment by reducing their own preventive or avoidance activities. Similarly, increased restitution will decrease the incentive for potential victims to take preventive measures. That does not mean restitution is bad or that the government should not increase the sanction for identity theft. Simply, we need to recognize the interrelationships between the actions of each actor in this system. By doing so, we can determine how to prioritize crimes in terms of government enforcement and sentencing policy. Finally, victims can aff ect the probability of conviction by the amount of cooperation they give to government offi cials. 20 This will depend on their treatment in the criminal justice system, including the amount of time they must spend resolving legal controversies.
As noted above, the cost of prevention is likely to diff er among potential victims. Thus, the elderly or mentally handicapped might be more vulnerable to telemarketing fraud, for example, which might justify more punitive sanctions where vulnerable victims are included. In addition, the government might have a higher cost of prevention than the private sector, as individual decision makers within the government do not have the same private incentives that their private sector counterparts have to help prevent the government from becoming a victim. This might justify more punitive sanctions for economic crimes against the government relative to crimes against private businesses.
Law enforcement
Law enforcement agencies -both investigative and prosecutorial -are obviously key actors in the criminal justice system. To the extent that devoting more attention to one type of crime increases the probability of detection, conviction, and punishment of criminal wrongdoing, this will result in a deterrent eff ect for that crime.
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Although we would like to think that all alleged crimes are given equal treatment in both investigation and prosecution, the reality is that government resources are limited and each agency must establish enforcement priorities. 22 Those priorities might depend on the perceived harm caused by certain types of crimes, the diffi culty of establishing criminal liability, community standards, and even the political aspirations of individual 20 See Deborah Kelly, 'Victim Participation in the Criminal Justice System', in Victims of Crime: Problems, Policies, Programs, edited by Arthur J. Lurigo, R.C. Davis and W.G. Skogan (1990), pp. 172-3 (noting that lack of victim cooperation results in high dismissal rates for criminal prosecutions). 21 However, it may also increase the rates of other crimes on the margin. prosecutors. 23 Given scarce resources and the need to prioritize workloads, one factor that inevitably aff ects investigators and prosecutors is the ultimate punishment the alleged criminal off ender can expect to receive. Sentencing guidelines can send strong signals to prosecutors about which crimes should be the highest priority and which should be placed lower on the priority list. Thus, when the Commission increased the probability and severity of punishment for white-collar off enders in 1987, it should have had two eff ects. First, it should have deterred and incapacitated off enders, and second, it should have shifted the priorities of some law enforcement offi cials towards white-collar crime. Both of these eff ects tend to reduce white-collar crime. 
Courts
As should be clear by now, sentencing guidelines can have an important eff ect on the incentives of the other actors -and not just the criminals -in this 'system'. Sentences issued by courts provide signals to all parties about the 'price' that one will have to pay for committing a crime that is detected and successfully prosecuted. Such potential off enders may be deterred if the sanction is severe enough. However, as indicated above, there are other eff ects from raising sanctions. Potential victims might take less care to prevent or avoid crimes as they benefi t from the increased deterrent eff ect of more severe sanctions. Potential off enders might shift to other crimes that have relatively less onerous sanctions attached to them. Prosecutors might move certain crimes up or down their priority list as they adjust to these signals about the 'payoff ' from their prosecutorial eff orts.
Although most of these eff ects are intended, one must also be careful about unintended consequences. For example, courts setting very high penalties on crimes where innocent individuals are easily mistaken might deter socially benefi cial activity as well as criminal activity. This is of particular concern for off enses that might be committed by legitimate businesses as opposed to businesses largely established for the purposes of committing criminal activities.
Potential mistaken off enders
Unfortunately, there is always the possibility that an innocent individual will be charged with a crime. There are many safeguards in our legal system to prevent such mistakes from happening -and in reality, it is probably a rare event. However, in some cases -especially in the area of economic crimes -the fact that there is always a possibility that an innocent person will be charged with a crime can have important behavioral consequences on the innocent. 25 The concern over mistaken off enders is a particular problem in the area of economic or regulatory off enses involving commerce. 26 For example, although stringent copyright protection laws are important, suppose copyright violations were a strict liability off ense with severe punishments for off enders. This would certainly deter copyright violations and have a positive eff ect on innovation and creativity. Yet, there is also the possibility that well-meaning, law-abiding individuals and businesses who might otherwise use copyrighted material legally will decide that the risk of making a mistake and violating the law outweighs the potential gain from engaging in that line of business. Thus, there will be some negative eff ect on innovation and creativity. This is just one example, and even if this particular example is stretched, the concern is real. Anytime an illegal activity may come about as a result of a normal business activity, stringent penalties run the risk of deterring both the illegal and legitimate business activity. This is the 'overdeterrence' problem that economists often talk about in the context of corporate crime. 27 It is a particular problem in emerging areas of criminal law where the scope of the law and defi nitions of illegal activity are largely untested. 28 Thus, it is of particular concern in the area of new technology crimes. It is also why we often resort to civil sanctions for these types of off enses, where the remedy is injunctive relief and perhaps some monetary compensation. Thus, for example, the Federal Trade Commission's (FTC) mandate to control misleading and deceptive advertising generally involves this form of sanction instead of more punitive approaches. 29 Legitimate fi rms that want to try new advertising messages know that they will generally have the fi rst bite of the apple, so that if a new practice is deemed to be misleading, the repercussions to the fi rm acting in good faith are not devastating.
Recently, this concern about overdeterrence has come to the forefront in eff orts to control money laundering through wire transfers and prepaid credit cards. Reportedly, several companies left the wire transfer business following new rules enacted after 9/11, and there is concern that the same might happen with prepaid card providers if money-laundering rules and penalties are further tightened. 
Implications of the economic model of criminal justice
There are many ways which society can reduce crime and its eff ects. To the extent that we can educate, exert social pressures, and increase the stigma associated with certain activities, we might be able to reduce the propensity of potential off enders to commit crime. Potential victims might be able to do a better job of protecting themselves by taking more precautions, buying encryption software, asking more questions and otherwise taking private actions to reduce their probability of being victimized. We might spend more on law enforcement by hiring new Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) agents, more United States Attorneys, or better equipment to increase the productivity of our existing offi cers. This will raise the probability of detection and hence increase the deterrent eff ect of our law enforcement eff orts. Finally, we might increase the severity of sanctions to deter potential criminals and/or incapacitate known criminals from committing repeat off enses. This chapter focuses on the implications of this economic model for setting rational sentencing policy. That means I will assume all of the other actors' actions remain unchanged, except to the extent that sentencing behavior infl uences them.
Off enders should be held accountable for all losses and costs
associated with their actions Since the goal of the economic model is to optimally deter illegal behavior, and rational potential criminals take into account the expected punishment they will receive from their actions, we want to set penalties based on the losses caused by their criminal actions. This result follows from the 'optimal penalty' model of Gary Becker, which calls for a sanction equal to the harm divided by the probability of detection. 31 the severity of punishment should increase with the size of the loss. 32 The diffi culty in implementing this simple notion will become evident in a later section of this chapter, when I discuss the 'foreseeability' standard in defi ning loss. 33 In addition, the severity of punishment should increase with the cost of apprehension, conviction, and the cost of imposing a penalty.
34
3.2 Crimes that are diffi cult to detect or prosecute should be punished more severely Becker's model supports the theory that crimes which are diffi cult to detect or prosecute should be punished more severely. 35 Potential off enders weigh the expected punishment against the expected gain they will receive from committing the crime. Since expected punishment is smaller when the risk of detection is small, potential off enders will tend to commit crimes that are relatively more diffi cult to detect and/or prosecute. Thus, the optimal penalty should increase in order to take this into account.
Certain punishment has a deterrent eff ect even if average punishment
is unchanged One of the most important insights of the economics of crime model is that if sanctions are set suffi ciently high, only people who prefer risk can be expected to commit crimes. 36 Empirical evidence supports this fi nding.
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Given this fact, one of the best ways to deter risk-preferring individuals from committing crimes is to impose a certain punishment that those individuals will foresee as being likely. Sentencing guidelines are a step in the right direction provided that they do not contribute to uncertainty. Thus, sentencing guidelines should not be based on random events that are beyond the control of the individual off ender.
Reputation loss from conviction might be more important than prison
sentence The criminal sanction is only one of a myriad of punishments that might be imposed on criminal off enders. 38 In addition to civil or administrative penalties, criminals might suff er the wrath of their community in terms of future employability. Doctors or lawyers might lose their licenses to practice their professions. 39 Others will be kept away from positions of importance that rely upon trust or otherwise involve some type of fi duciary duty. Indeed, there is empirical evidence that criminal off enders with higher legitimate pre-conviction earnings pay a much more serious price in terms of post-conviction earnings. 40 There have also been calls for increasing the use of 'shaming' as a form of punishment itself. 41 From a policy perspective, criminal sentencing should take into account all of the other penalties -both government and market imposed -on the off ender. Prison time is a last resort and is called for if the others do not adequately deter or there is a need for incapacitation to decrease the risk of recidivism.
Monetary sanctions are preferable to prison
Another important implication of the Becker model is that because prisons are costly, we should resort to less costly means of punishment to the extent that they off er adequate deterrence and otherwise serve the goals of punishment. 42 Thus, if monetary penalties adequately deter and punish off enders, that is the preferred method. The diffi culty in implementing this as policy is that the fi ne for many such off enders would easily exceed their assets; thus prison is necessary. 43 To take a simple example, if there is a one in fi ve chance of detecting and convicting a person who fraudulently obtains $1 million in a credit scam, the optimal penalty would be $5 million ($1 million of which might be used for restitution). In reality, 38 See 'Crime and Punishment', supra note 3, at pp. 179-80. 
Need to take into account interdependencies of crimes and actors
For example, as discussed above, although potential victims can take precautions against victimization, the cost of avoidance might vary across individuals. In some cases, it might cost less for potential victims to avoid victimization than it does for law enforcement agencies to prevent the crime from occurring. However, in other cases, the cost of avoidance might be prohibitive. In those instances, where crimes impose higher avoidance costs or where it is more diffi cult for potential victims to avoid victimization, off enders should be punished more severely relative to crimes where potential victims can cheaply avoid the crime. The fact that the criminal justice arena is an interdependent system also suggests that before a policy is developed, the behavior of other actors is considered. Indeed, there is some evidence that while the Commission increased corporate criminal sanctions in 1990, this increase was partly off set by reducing other monetary sanctions -hence, the overall eff ect was not as punitive as envisioned. 45 In addition to the overall goal of reducing disparity through restricting judicial discretion, Congress specifi cally called for increased sanctions for white-collar off enders. 46 The Commission followed this mandate by increasing both the probability of imprisonment and the length of the sentence for most whitecollar off enses. It also increased monetary penalties signifi cantly.
Generally, the Guidelines are based on 'off ense levels', where each crime is given a base level and increases or decreases from that level are based on various elements of the off ense (for example, whether a weapon was present, if there was a particularly vulnerable victim, or the dollar magnitude of the loss or gain). These off ense levels, coupled with information on an off ender's prior criminal history, determine whether or not any prison time is warranted, and if so, the appropriate length (expressed in a range where the judge has some discretion). Off enders are virtually always required to pay restitution if there is a readily identifi able victim. Monetary penalties for corporations convicted of federal crimes are based on a 'multiple' of up to four times the maximum of 'loss' or 'gain'.
The remainder of this section applies the economic crime control model to several specifi c proposals that were under consideration in 2000 by the Commission when revising their guidelines for economic crimes. Section 4.1 considers the overriding question of whether the overall punishment for economic crimes should be increased. A variation on this proposal was to increase the punishment only for frauds involving very large losses. Section 4.2 examines whether the off ense level should be based on 'actual' versus 'intended' loss and the extent to which foreseeability should be used in defi ning loss. Finally, Section 4.3 considers whether or not interest should be included in the loss defi nition used to calculate the monetary fi ne.
Increased off ense levels for fraud
One proposal considered by the Commission was to increase the relationship between monetary losses and the off ense level -which would ultimately increase the length of prison sentences for larger frauds. One commentator, the Judicial Conference's Committee on Criminal Law ('Judicial Conference Report'), indicated that the fraud and theft guidelines were too lenient relative to street crime, and that the slope of the loss table was not steep enough. 47 In support of that position, they noted that there was no 'proportionality' between dollar losses and off ense levels. For example, while there is a three-level diff erence between a $10,000 fraud and a $70,000 fraud, there is only a one-level diff erence between and a $1.5 million and a $2.5 million fraud. 48 Although the jury is still out on the need to increase the loss tables, there is no compelling evidence that such changes are necessary or even prudent. First, sanctions have increased dramatically for economic crime off enders relative to pre-Guideline sanctions. 49 Second, the eff ect of infl ation on the loss tables has increased (and will continue to increase) the severity of punishment. 50 Third, there is no empirical evidence that economic crimes have been increasing in number or severity. Fourth, the notion of proportionality is not one that should be operationalized by simple statistics. In addition to considering these arguments below, this section proposes reforms that would address some of the concerns of proportionality in a manner that is more consistent with economic theory and the concept of 'marginal deterrence'. 52 In addition, just two years later the Commission changed the fraud loss table and increased the severity level for all frauds greater than $40,000.
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According to Commission data, sanctions have become increasingly severe for economic crime off enders (defi ned as including fraud, tax evasion and embezzlement). 54 In fact, as shown in Table 14 .1, the rate of imprisonment has increased from 39 percent in 1984 to 61 percent in 1999 -a 50 percent increase. Of those who received prison sentences, the average length for economic crime off enders increased slightly from about 14 months to 18 months. The reason the average sentence length for economic crimes did not increase very much was primarily due to the fact that many off enders who previously would have received probation now spend some time in prison. However, the short prison sentences that these off enders received off set the increased sentence length that the Guidelines imposed on other economic crime off enders. Thus, the Guidelines did increase the severity of punishment for economic crimes. More importantly, the 'expected' prison sentence (probability of serving 50 See infra Section 4.1.1. 
Infl ation has increased the severity of punishment
The Guidelines fi rst went into eff ect in 1987. Although the infl ation rate in the US has been relatively low since then, time does take its toll. For example, $100 in 1987 had the same buying power as $150 in the year 2000. Thus, if we compare the 'seriousness' of two frauds, each involving $6,000, for example, but one being committed in 1987 and another in the year 2000, the 1987 fraud was much more serious in terms of victim and social harm. Yet, if we look at the loss tables, both frauds of $6,000 earn base off ense levels of eight (six plus two for the $6,000 loss). 56 In fact, if we convert the 1987 fraud into year 2000 dollars, it would be the equivalent of a $4,000 fraud in 2000. However, a $4,000 fraud only receives an off ense level of seven.
The eff ect of infl ation has therefore been to increase the severity of the fraud, theft and tax loss tables by approximately one level between 1987 and 2000. Furthermore, this infl ationary creep in the Guidelines will continue every year into the future, eventually increasing severity by another level and onward. This infl ationary creep aff ects the entire loss table. However, it does not aff ect the monetary fi ne calculation for organizational defendants, since infl ation does not aff ect the multiple that is applied to the loss.
No empirical evidence that economic crimes are on the rise
Although there is anecdotal evidence that economic and white-collar crime is on the 55 Id.
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See Guidelines, §2B1.1(b)(1) -Fraud Loss rise, there is no empirical evidence to support this claim. As one who has studied white-collar and corporate crime for years, I know the diffi culty of measuring crime rates. Unlike street crimes, there are no comprehensive government surveys or systematic collection agencies that report on the incidence of white-collar or corporate crime. Often, victims are unaware or misinformed about their victimization, making any such estimates suspect.
What evidence do we have that fraud is on the rise? We are commonly told that health-care fraud is an increasing problem. A poll by the AARP in 1999 found that 90 percent of respondents believed health-care fraud was steady or increasing. 57 Yet, according to government estimates, Medicare 'actually lost about seven cents of every dollar to fraud, waste and mistakes in 1998. . . [which is] only half of what was lost by the government's health insurance program for the elderly and disabled just two years ago'. 58 This reduction in fraud was attributed to stepped-up enforcement. 59 This is just one example of how there is misinformation about the growth in fraud.
What about fraud convictions? According to IRS data, criminal prosecutions were recommended in 3,526 cases in 1987, 60 compared to an almost identical number (3,427) in 1998. However, the number of convictions per year appears to have increased from about 2,500 to 3,000 per year. 61 Similarly, the number of convictions for fi nancial fraud reported by the United States Department of Justice (DOJ) Criminal Division increased slightly from 2,309 in 1987 to 2,613 in 1998. 62 According to Commission data, the number of fraud off enders sentenced under the Guidelines has remained relatively stable, with 5,905 off enders sentenced in 1995 and 6,199 in 1999. 63 Embezzlement increased from 809 to 949, while tax off enses have decreased from 737 to 722 over the same time period. 64 None of these fi gures indicates a signifi cant increase in cases tried in Federal courts between 1987 and 2000.
As noted above, the Guidelines signifi cantly increased the likelihood that white-collar off enders would spend time in prison -and increased the average time served. Recall from the model that an increase in expected punishment is likely to have several eff ects. Although it might deter potential off enders from committing the crime, it might also spur law enforcement agencies and prosecutors to pursue more cases against those off enders since the 'payoff ' is now greater. Therefore, even if there is a deterrent eff ect from the higher punishment, the 'detection' eff ect might off set, and even overwhelm, any reduction in crime. That is, even if the crime rate is going down, we might observe more convictions. Thus, it is generally not appropriate to draw inferences about the rate of crime from sentencing data alone. Dramatic changes in sentencing policy are only justifi able for addressing to dramatic increases in fraud or the rate of crime in general. Currently no persuasive evidence of such increases exists.
Proportionality requires more than simple statistics
As noted above, the loss tables that determine the off ense level were criticized for being 'fl at'. For example, while there is a three-level diff erence between a $10,000 fraud and a $70,000 fraud, there is only a one-level diff erence between a $1.5 million and a $2.5 million fraud. The Commission originally set the loss table for fraud by empirically estimating the relationship between loss and prison time from past practice and using that as a guide.
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At a minimum, we should note that the 'fl at' structure was consistent with judicial preferences. Is there any reason why doubling the dollar value of a fraud at low levels should result in the same increase in off ense level as it does at high levels of loss? Is there any reason why a doubling of the dollar value of a fraud should double the length of a prison sentence? The answer to both these questions is 'no'.
In theory, there are several reasons why the loss table should be 'fl at'. First, larger frauds are generally easier to detect since they involve more victims, larger losses per victim, and/or victims who are more eager to obtain restitution and retribution. Second, the fact that criminals tend to be risk preferring suggests that a more certain punishment has more of a deterrent eff ect than a more severe punishment. Thus, we should be willing to trade off reduced sentences at the upper end of the distribution for more certain -but shorter-sentences for most white-collar off enders. Third, individuals (especially criminal off enders) are likely to have very large discount rates (that is, they put a large premium on current consumption and less weight on their future). 66 This reduces the deterrent value of long prison sentences.
In addition to proportionality across the fraud loss table, the Judicial Conference noted that there is no proportionality between street crimes and economic crimes. 67 However, it is diffi cult to compare the severity of punishment across crime types unless factors such as harm and detectability are compared as well. Presumably, someone who sells $10,000 worth of cocaine or takes $10,000 by threat of physical harm causes more social harm than someone who embezzles $10,000 from a bank. Accordingly, a small fraud starts with a base off ense level of six, while the small-time cocaine dealer receives a base level of 12 and a robbery has a base off ense of 20 (or 22 for a bank robbery).
68 Even burglary has a higher base level (17 for burglary of a residence or 18 for a burglary of $10,000). 69 Note that the commentary to the Guidelines indicates that residential burglary has a higher base level than other burglaries because of the increased risk of physical or psychological harm. 70 To the extent that fraud involves victims who suff er serious psychological trauma or fi nancial hardships, one might want to increase the base off ense level. The current Guidelines do this with a provision for a two-point increase for vulnerable victims, or a four-point increase for a large number of vulnerable victims. 71 and more than minimal planning would receive. 73 The diff erence in base sentences is only about three months. However, the larger dollar values of between $500,000 and $8 million (depending on the drug) would have a base off ense level of 32. 74 The highest off ense level for fraud with more than minimal planning is 26. 75 Of course, the diff erence between an off ense level of 26 and 32 is fi ve years -the former being slightly higher than fi ve years, while the latter is greater than ten years.
Therefore, it does appear that both the off ense level and prison sentence increase faster for drug off enses than they do for comparable dollar values of fraud. But there are other reasons why the large fraud off ender might be dealt with less severely than the large drug dealer. First, it is much more diffi cult to detect and convict a large drug dealer. They have sophisticated networks of workers who shield them from legal culpability. More important, perhaps, is the fact that there are generally few readily identifi able victims who would complain about the drug dealer. On the other hand, large frauds are likely to be exposed, as victims or class action lawyers will no doubt seek out legal authorities to remedy their concerns. Thus, I would expect frauds to be much more easily detected and a perpetrator convicted than in the case of drug off enses. Recall, in the model, that more detectible crimes require less severe sanctions for optimal deterrence.
Proposal for diff erentiating between temporary and permanent losses
A fraud that results in victim losses and ultimate restitution paid of $1 million is diff erent from a fraud that results in $1 million where no restitution is ever paid. Yet, the current Guidelines treat these off enses as being identical. Restitution is generally required where victims and losses are identifi able. 76 However, the judge is free to reduce restitution below victim loss based on fi nancial considerations and the assets of the off ender. 77 Further, there is no penalty to the off ender if the amount of restitution ordered does not fully cover victim losses. The result of this anomaly is that there is an incentive built into the Guidelines to hide assets or squander them on a high style of living. An alternative rule would differentiate between off enders that can aff ord to pay restitution and those that cannot.
Although there are many ways that one could implement such a proposal, one method might be to add the uncompensated amount to the 73 Guidelines, § 2F1.1. 74 Guidelines, § 2D1.1(a)(1-3). 75 Guidelines, § 2F1.1(b)(2). 76 Guidelines, § 5E1.1(a)(1). 77 Guidelines, § 5E1.1(f). Alternatively, the Commission might spell out specifi c off ense characteristics leading to an increase in the off ense level depending on how much of the victim loss is not recoverable. This proposal would partly address one of the concerns over the severity of the loss tables that was mentioned in the Judicial Conference Report. The report took note of United States v. McDowell, where all but $8,000 of a $300,000 fraud had been spent and was not recoverable for victim restitution. 78 The concern expressed by the Judicial Conference centered on what it considered a low off ense level of 15 and a resulting guideline range of 18 to 24 months. This range was based on an off ense level calculation of six for the base fraud, eight for the dollar loss, and one additional net point for off ense and off ender adjustments. The trial judge ignored the Guidelines and imposed an upward departure to a level 19 and a sentence of 37 months. The trial judge's reasoning was overturned, but the sentencing departure was upheld on other grounds. The proposal by the Judicial Conference was to raise the severity of the loss tables so that a loss of this magnitude would yield a level 18, which provides for 27 to 33 months. 79 However, that approach would also increase the sanction for the fraud off ender who did not spend the money and was able to pay restitution. My proposal would treat these two off enders diff erently. For example, if the Commission were to simply add uncompensated losses to the existing loss estimate, the off ender who paid back the $300,000 in restitution would still receive a level 15 with a range of 18 to 24 months. However, the off ender that squandered all but $8,000 would be charged with a loss of $592,000 ($300,000 fraud plus $292,000 unpaid restitution), for an off ense level of 17 and a sentence of 24 to 30 months. Alternatively, specifi c upward adjustment could be built into the Guidelines to increase the off ense level for such cases accordingly.
Intended versus actual loss and the issue of causation
One of the most diffi cult issues in drafting Guidelines is whether to use intended or actual loss as the basis for computing an off ense level. Related to this question is what standard of 'causation' should be used in determining loss. To answer these questions, recall the purpose of sanctions -to provide foreseeable consequences for illegal behavior that will optimally deter potential off enders from committing crimes. In other words, potential off enders should be able to anticipate the punishment they will receive if they commit an act.
From a pure deterrence standpoint, if an individual off ender is risk neutral, it does not matter whether the penalty is based on intended or actual loss. Before deciding on whether or not to commit a crime, the 'expected' loss is all that can be estimated, and thus the potential off ender relies upon that measure in determining whether or not to commit a crime. The fact that will be punished on the realization of actual loss does not change that decision calculus if he is risk neutral. However, if the potential off ender is risk preferring (as, I argued earlier, criminal off enders tend to be), he prefers the gamble to the expected value of the outcome. This means that a penalty based on the expected value of the outcome will have a greater deterrent eff ect than one that is based on the actual outcome.
Although 'expected loss' is the appropriate criterion for determining off ense levels, note that if a loss is not foreseeable, it cannot be part of the expected loss calculation. That is, if the potential off ender does not foresee the possibility of an outcome occurring, it is not taken into account in the decision calculus about whether or not to off end. Thus, a 'foreseeability' standard that ignores such losses would be appropriate. The diffi culty is in determining which losses are foreseeable.
Consider two diff erent off enders, both of whom commit insurance frauds that take $100,000 from customers with no intention of paying claims. Total claims by customers of the fi rst fraud are $50,000, while customers of the second fraud incur $10 million in losses following a disastrous hurricane. Under most defi nitions of 'foreseeable', one would argue that the fi rst off ender's customer claims of $50,000 were foreseeable. However, even in the second case, courts have ruled that such losses were indeed caused by the fact that there was no insurance and hence the full value of the victim losses is the proper measure of loss.
80 I believe these courts are largely correct in considering the loss foreseeable as long as there is some estimable chance that a hurricane would hit the area being insured. The problem is in the current rule that calls for calculation of actual instead of expected loss for purposes of determining the off ense level -irrespective of whether the loss was foreseeable.
Under the current loss rules, the fi rst off ender is likely to be held liable for $150,000 in losses ($100,000 in fraudulent premium plus $50,000 in claims not paid), while the second will be held accountable for $10,100,000 80 See in losses ($100,000 in fraudulent premium plus $10 million in unpaid claims). This eff ectively means that off enders are entering a lottery, where they know that if they get caught, they will be held accountable for lost premiums plus any actual losses that occur. As noted above, the ideal way to handle these two cases would be to sanction them the same -based on the 'expected loss'. In this case, expected loss would equal the premiums ($100,000) plus the average payout of insurance policies of this type. Thus, if 90 percent of premiums normally go to pay claims, the expected loss in this case would be $190,000. This is higher than the loss for the fi rst off ender, but lower than the loss for the second one. Note that I have not argued for $190,000 in restitution. Restitution has a completely diff erent goal than effi cient crime control -making the victim whole. In this example, the restitution amount for the fi rst off ender should be $150,000, while the second off ender would be entitled to $10,100,000. Even if an 'intended loss' standard is adopted for purposes of computing an off ense level, actual loss plays an important role in sentencing the fraud off ender. Moreover, note that in the previous section, I proposed that the unpaid restitution be used to increase the off ense level of the crime in the case wherein the second off ender does not pay full restitution, thus preserving marginal deterrence.
My analysis of these two insurance frauds is contrary to both the current approach and the proposed changes to loss rules. Furthermore, I realize that there are many potential objections to my proposal. First, it might be unworkable in practice, as it is often more diffi cult to estimate the expected loss in a case than to observe actual loss. A careful analysis of recent cases and perhaps some boilerplate provisions to reduce the burden on the sentencing court could overcome some of these objections. Second, because of the manner in which we communicate crimes and punishment, concern might be expressed that it would send a bad signal to potential criminals if the sanction for imposing a loss on victims of over $10,000,000 appears to be a slap on the wrist. Third, by imposing higher sanctions when actual loss is greater, one might argue that we provide an incentive for off enders to avoid these more costly outcomes. Thus, for example, if potential off enders were contemplating setting up a fraudulent insurance scheme, they might think twice about locating the operation in Florida, and instead move to an area where extreme outcomes are much less likely. Thus, to the extent that off enders can reduce the likelihood of some of these 'controllable events', using an actual loss standard is likely to lower actual losses. My response to these latter two concerns, however, is that the requirement that restitution be imposed, coupled with my proposal to increase loss by any unpaid restitution, largely overcomes these concerns and preserves marginal deterrence.
Interest
Currently, the loss rules for fraud exclude 'interest the victim could have earned on such funds had the off ense not occurred'. 81 Similarly, in a fraudulent loan case, the rules appear to exclude interest payments a lender might have received and instead focus on 'the amount of loan not repaid at the time the off ense is discovered, reduced by the amount the lending institution has recovered. . .'. 82 That is, although lending institutions might incur signifi cant foregone interest income on a fraudulent loan, this amount is not included as a loss.
Apparently, there is disagreement among the courts over how to interpret the current Guidelines, as many circuits have decisions that explicitly include interest that had been bargained for, but exclude other interest calculations based on the opportunity cost of the fraudulent losses. For example, courts have included late fees and interest in cases involving unauthorized use of credit cards or specifi c investment returns that were promised but not delivered. 83 However, they have refused to permit similar lost profi ts in fraudulent investments when interest payments were not specifi ed. 84 The distinction is supposedly between contractually promised interest and the opportunity cost or time value of money.
Economic theory would tell us that interest is an important component of loss. The time value of money is well established in economics as being worthy of consideration in all areas of cost-benefi t analysis and policy analysis in general. 85 From the perspective of the victim, there is no doubt that foregone interest is a loss. Moreover, from the perspective of the potential off ender who is deciding whether or not engage in a fraudulent activity, the time value of money will certainly play a role.
For example, an off ender who defrauds victims out of $1 million and is able to hold that amount for several years before being sentenced will have 81 into the eff ect that proposed changes in sentencing policy would likely have on crime rates. Key to this understanding is awareness that sentencing policy should not be viewed in isolation, but instead as part of an interdependent crime and punishment system. Increasing the severity of punishment might deter crime, but it might also have other unintended consequences such as making other crimes more attractive, causing off enders to take more expensive and elaborate activities to evade detection, causing potential victims to take less care in preventing victimization, and encouraging law enforcement offi cials to prosecute more cases of that nature. In some cases, increasing the severity of punishment might even stifl e legitimate behavior. Thus, it is important that the Commission work through the implications of any Guideline revisions on the likely actions of other parties.
